Do You MIND [verb]? Or ARE you Mind [noun]?

 

Following on from a previous post in which he corrupted Descartes' linking of thinking and ontology, Slicer considers the organ of thinking, in the context of being. Where is that organ situated? Is it for men often inside their pants, as women may allege? (Slicer will come back to that territory later in this post). Is the brain the seat of personhood? Or are personhood, individual personality, and conceptualisation merely illusions produced by our brains?

Does our mind ‘inhabit’ our brain (or indeed our whole physique) or is the ‘mind’ merely the sum of electrochemical neural impulses within the cranium? If the latter, where does this leave our sense of personal identity, our belief systems and our judgments - even apparently logical ones? It suggests that they are only an illusion, with no standalone reality. Some may be selected systems of perception, selected because they have survival benefit, but then we would need to explain why a false notion of reality should survive. The problem this presents for an atheistic worldview has been recognized by Richard Dawkins, sufficiently so that he has felt the need to dream up the speculative notion of the meme. However, the reductionist/monist/materialist who labels religious belief as an illusory product of neurotransmissory imagination has to subject his/her own concepts to the same critique.

The materialist appears to be on course to circular, self-destructing argument, recognized by biologist and rationalist J B S Haldane when he wrote:

“It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms.”

Haldane’s assessment suggests (by logical extension) that the basis for an argument that religious belief/experience is illusory, also renders illusory the argument itself. It would seem to lead to the conclusion that, despite superficial appearance to the contrary, there is no substantive difference between a vivid imagination and cognitive thought.

Of course, Slicer is being provocative, and selective in quoting Haldane, as others have done before him. He recognizes that the issue is whether or not we have a correct model of the world around us - whether we can discriminate between what is real and what is not. In evolutionary terms, there would be obvious survival advantage in being able to do so... not much good being unable to tell what is a predator from what is food, or a mate...

Nonetheless, if our consciousness is an illusion, on what a shaky foundation folk are standing when they claim that holding a purely materialist worldview is more ‘worthy’ than holding a different position:

  

Tim really likes Christmas, and Slicer really likes Tim but finds this poignant song about loved ones inevitably sad. Interestingly, such claims relating to 'unworthiness' of religious concepts are often accompanied by language suggesting that sceptics hold higher moral ground than those they oppose. Those of us who hold to a worldview that the mind ‘inhabits’ the physical brain would seem to have a stronger footing for the notion of a hierarchy of ‘worthiness’ of ideas, since in that worldview conscious thought has an existence not confined to a mind which is itself an illusion.

When it comes to determining whether or not there is more to personhood than neuro-chemical transmission, we’re back to hypothesis and belief. Arguably our survival to reproduce is usually not influenced by whether we hold one or other worldview; however, some would contest that our ultimate fate is influenced by the choices we make – but that particular survival test (if it’s there) lies in the future for each of us considering these issues. So, for the present, a monist/purely materialist worldview is a concept just the same as that held by dualists and by those who, like Slicer, believe there is more to reality/life than physical components and processes, but aren’t sure whether any of the many varieties of dualism has got it nailed.

Is our consciousness, our self-awareness, our sense of being individuals really just a useful and accidental collection of thought processes, which evolved to enhance the likelihood of our survival to reproduce? If so, this must then also apply to the feelings we have towards our loved ones. Dare we submit all our thought processes, and emotions, and sense of identity to this view - that they are nothing more than evolved neurotransmission pathways, having no essence apart from that? Feelings are mirages, with no ‘meaning’ apart from being tools to survive?

Is the rise of post-modernism, with its subjectivity, just a wrong turning along the way of 'progress?' Or does it betray that, sometimes, in the words of Coldplay:

"Questions of science, science and progress

Do not speak as loud as my heart"?

 

Many modern (physicalist) philosophers believe/argue that the ‘self’ is an illusion. Is there in reality no ‘us,’ beyond a machine capable of reproducing its genome, with consciousness and sense of personal identity merely tools to help it do so better? With this approach, questions around meaning in our existence are (conveniently) deemed “the wrong question” or ‘meaningless’ questions – thought crime. What a great recipe for despair... which must of course also be a ‘feeling’ with no substance other than molecular interaction. 

Bertrand Russell clearly recognized this when he wrote:

“Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs are but the outcome of accidental collisions of atoms.... all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only... on the firm foundation of unyielding despair can the soul’s habitation henceforth be safely built.”

Whilst some would speculate evolutionary advantage in some characteristics of despair or depression, it seems irrational to Slicer that despair would enhance the prospects of survival to reproduce. So why has it persisted as a feeling and/or state?

In materialist thinking, concepts like good and evil then must also be illusions, abstract; concrete only in so far as the collection of neural impulses which amount to their perception. Moreover, arguments that we have no real freedom of choice, being destined by genetic predisposition/determinism at a neural level, leave us deserving neither credit for a ‘more worthy’ worldview, nor accountability or blame for evil/harmful decisions/acts.

It should come then as no surprise that some evolutionary psychologists explain rape in Darwinian terms as a survival mechanism:

A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion. Thornhill R, Palmer CT. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Prof Frans B M de Waal, reviewing the above book in the New York Times notes that female and feminist voices are dismissed as ideological; whereas scientists – like the authors – engage in the objective search for truth. Slicer may be under an illusion, but he perceives that de Waal is being ironic... He makes quite a few other interesting and valuable points, which are worth checking out:  Download Survival of the Rapist.

As evolutionary biologist Jerry Coyne observes: 

“If evolutionary biology is a soft science, evolutionary psychology is its flabby underbelly... Freud is no longer the preferred behavioural paradigm. Now Darwin is ascendant. Blame your genes, not your mother.” 

Slicer currently accepts evolution as the likely process used in the creation of man. However, he too is sceptical of its use as a one-size-fits-all, magic bullet explanation for everything, including all aspects of behaviour. By the same token, he resists seeing mankind reduced/confined to a genetic description/explanation, and considers genetics cannot be used as a justification of moral evil. Of course for the (allegedly) dispassionately objective monist, the problem may be avoided by arguing that there is no such thing as evil – it’s just a way of describing what is harmful to the species.... There is, of course, the distaste we have for torturing puppies – so maybe it’s not just in the context of harm to our own species, but also to species (or at least their young) which we don’t perceive as threatening our survival.

Slicer tends to stick with a more traditional view of evil, well expressed in song by Jakob Dylan, as being a real entity rather than a concept which is merely an illusion within our cerebral cortex:

Download Jakob - Evil

He sees no reason to abandon the view that feelings, judgments (moral, logical & instinctive/intuitive), and decisions are intrinsic elements of a person; an ‘I’ or a ‘you’ who is greater than the sum of our parts – indeed, an ‘I’ or ‘you’ who inhabits those parts. If so, that would allow us hope rather than despair... and real choices... you might even call it “free-thinking” (if some materialists hadn’t already tried to claim a monopoly on the term, despite forbidding us from asking questions related to meaning).

 

Elton & Leon's recent venture into philosophy might be closer to the truth than a philosophy dressed up as valid science which claims that in reality there is no 'you,' just a genetic machine which imagines it has 'self'.... "I, Robot," anyone?

Slicer realises that he is out of step with what is philosophically fashionable at this point in time, and expects some accusations that he's out of touch with reality. However, he's not going to be intimidated by that particular whip, and figures that he has motivation to follow the example of another who took a thrashing for not submitting to an emperor (with or without clothes):

 

"When the whip that’s keeping you in line doesn’t make him jump

 Say he’s hard-of-hearin’, say that he’s a chump

Say he’s out of step with reality as you try to test his nerve

 Because he doesn’t pay no tribute to the king that you serve..."

 

 

 

Comments

[Di]

I really liked the music. Specially the song from Tim. I liked the way just when one song ended, I had finished reading the segment below and was ready for another song to play while trying to take in what you were saying. I have believed for some time now that we are more than matter and am now content to accept that in this form/human body, none of us has the capacity to truly grasp exactly how. Thankyou for making my brain work out!

[Shane]

Dude, I'm going to have to come back to this later! For now, I leave you with the puzzle as to whether the Mona Lisa is just a collection of atoms... I think you are way too down on the behaviours of complex systems, and there is perhaps a teensy wee tendency to reifying concepts like "depression" or even "consciousness". More later (thanks for the reminder to pop by :-)

[Slicer]

Thanks, Shane. Hope you've got a better puzzle to come ;-)....No I don't think the Mona Lisa is just a collection of atoms (tho it is that) - it's art.... and those who would try to define whether or not it's good art by some kind of scientific description are just gonna demonstrate the limitations of the scientific method. Now whether art represents something transcendent/other-worldly.. there's a question/puzzle!.... maybe the image-makers/creators have inherited those talents...

[Patrick]

Interesting. I have a couple of points:
1) Finding the implications of an idea unpalatable does not make the idea untrue.
2) I don't see how the idea of 'no self' inevitably leads to despair, as you seem to suggest. This is a key idea to Buddhists and many of them seem like decidedly happy chappies; just look at the Dalai Lama!

[Slicer]

Thanks, Patrick. Re your first point, I agree entirely, and the same point can be made to those (eg Dawkins, Harris, Hitchens, Dennett) who argue that a faith position is unpalatable, and that the God of the Old Testament is such an unpalatable individual as to be unbelievable.

On the second point, I think many would find it unsettling that their "self" is an illusion - and that there is therefore no meaning to anything that individual consciousness holds dear. It raises questions like 'What is the point of even having a view?' Most folk want to make some kind of mark in the world as individuals, have some sense of personal achievement. If that person is just an illusion, it renders any concept of personal achievement an illusion too, as it does personal feelings about anything or anyone, and personal relationships. Clearly I don't claim to have come up with this idea de novo - it was, in fact, why I quoted Bertrand Russell.

It would be foolhardy to presume everyone sees it that way, so the Dalai Lama is welcome to his view, whatever it is - I agree many Buddhists seem happy but I'm not quite sure that there aren't other factors in play. In my very limited insight into Buddhism, I thought that rebirth has a role to play in Buddhist thinking. If so, I don't understand Buddhists' concept then of how at this point we have no self/consciousness and at the same time that our consciousness is reborn after death, albeit not entirely the same, but also not unconnected. Part of the point I was making was also that concepts would seem highly dubious if they are the product of a mind which is itself an illusion. Perhaps they distinguish between self and individual consciousness? Feel free to correct any misunderstanding I have re Buddhism on that front, or indeed to give me more of your thoughts. Thanks for contributing.

[Patrick]

Dawkins et al don't reject theism simply on the grounds of its unpalatability.

I don't have a concise response to your points about Buddhism but make the following points:

The Buddhist exhortation not to become attached to things is, paradoxically, often extended to Buddhist ideas. I have heard talks by Buddhist teachers in which they go to great lengths to explain a complex concept only to end by advising the listener to set the teaching aside if they don't find it helpful. In general, in Buddhism, people are encouraged (as far as I understand it) to let go of of things, including a limiting view of self and cherished beliefs (even Buddhist ones).

Buddhist attitudes to rebirth vary. In Tibetan forms it is prominent while it features hardly at all in Zen. Buddhists tend not to go in for denouncing false beliefs - to do so would betray attachment to an opposing belief - but I get the impression that many Zen Buddhists don't believe in reincarnation at all.

Buddhists, it seems to me, are a diverse lot and are less interested than many Christians seem to be in proving that they are right and their brothers are wrong. I suppose the common ground for all Buddhists would be the Four Noble Truths and refuge in the Three Jewels.

[Slicer]

Thanks again, Patrick, especially for your further info re Buddhist thinking and its varied nature. I can't help thinking tho' that, however it's phrased or presented, one can't escape the principle of a concept. Even if Buddhism 'tends not to go in for..' or avoids 'attachment' - those in themselves are concepts or principles, and ones arrived at by a conscious mind...

I wasn't suggesting that Dawkins et al reject theism just because they find it unpalatable. Nonetheless, in The God Delusion, Dawkins goes to some lengths in his attempts to ridicule faith using caricature and unpalatability. Harris uses the same approach. I was simply agreeing with you that palatability/unpalability is no reliable way to demonstrate what is true or what is untrue. If that applies to notions of the self or consciousness, it also applies to worldviews being presented negatively on the back being portrayed as unpalatable. Personally, I do find the contrast striking between 'life in all its fulness' and unpalatibility.

[Patrick]

Slicer, I realised I went off on a tangent and didn't really respond to your point: the apparent incompatibility of rebirth and 'no self'.

I agree; it's hard to reconcile both notions.

I think this was recognised in some of the old Buddhist texts which describe humans as being composed of 5 aggregates, not all of which (presumably) are reborn.

A more radical solution I've read is that the Buddha lived in a time and place that did not question reincarnation. Perhaps he, as a man of his time, didn't have sufficient insight to question it, or perhaps he felt that to do so was unnecessary or counterproductive.

Personally, I don't think any of the solutions are satisfactory. Nor do I see any reason to believe in reincarnation (though I can imagine how such a belief might have arisen).

[The Slicer]

Slicer has (unsurprisingly) discovered that other folk - more informed than him on these matters - have applied themselves to them. He notes the work of Prof Susan Greenfield. He also particularly liked a paper by Stuart Judge, Emeritus Reader in Physiology at Oxford c/o Faraday Institute, based at Cambridge University, UK, and available via this link:

http://www.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/faraday/resources/Faraday%20Papers/Faraday%20Paper%2016%20Judge_EN.pdf

[annouviap]

E 'un peccato che non posso parlare ora - molto occupato. Ma osvobozhus - necessariamente scrivere quello che penso.

[The Slicer]

Buona sera, annouviap. Scuse che non posso parlare Italiano.
If I understand correctly, you have a view/thought but will come back another time to write what you think.

[indespidiny]

man kann sagen, diese Ausnahme:) aus den Regeln

[DupImmuppyLot]

Gerade in das Ziel

[Ragreenax]

Ist Einverstanden, es ist das lustige StГјck

[Gatsloalp]

Claro. Y con esto me he encontrado. Discutiremos esta pregunta.

[Drederemtig]

maravillosamente, la informaciГіn muy buena